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8Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in
repeated games with signals
Olivier Gossner∗ , Rida Laraki† and Tristan Tomala‡
November 18, 2004
Abstract
For a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring, the maxmin
payoﬀ is obtained as the solution of an optimization problem deﬁned
on a set of probability distributions under entropy constraints. The
present paper oﬀers a method for solving such problems for the class
of 3-player 2 × 2-games.
1 Introduction
The cornerstone of the theory of repeated games is the Folk Theorem which
states, under a variety of assumptions, that when the horizon of the game
tends to inﬁnity, the limit set of equilibrium payoﬀs is the set of feasible and
individually rational payoﬀs.
Under perfect monitoring of actions, the individually rational level of a
player is the minmax of his one-stage payoﬀ function where his opponents
play uncorrelated mixed strategies. In games with imperfect monitoring,
information asymmetries about past play may create possibilities of corre-
lation for the opponents.
∗CNRS, CERAS. E-mail: Olivier.Gossner@enpc.fr
†CNRS, Laboratoire d’Econom´ etrie de l’Ecole Polytechnique. E-mail:
laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr
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8For instance, if players against i have perfect monitoring and if player i
observes no signals, the opponents can exchange messages that are secret for
player i and punish him to the minmax level in correlated mixed strategies.
In general games with imperfect monitoring, the minmax level for a player
lies between the correlated minmax and the uncorrelated minmax of the
one-shot game.
Gossner and Tomala [GT04a] study the diﬀerence of forecasting abilities
between a perfect observer of a stochastic process and an observer who gets
imperfect signals on the same process. Building on this result, Gossner and
Tomala [GT04b] consider repeated games where player i gets a signal on
his opponents’ action proﬁle which does not depend on his own action. At
a given stage of the game, i holds a belief on the mixed action proﬁle used
by players against him, represented by a probability distribution on the set
of uncorrelated mixed action proﬁles. Such a distribution, Z, is called a
correlation system.
To each correlation system corresponds an entropy variation, ∆H(Z),
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the expected entropy of the mixed action
proﬁle of players against i and the entropy of the signal observed by i.
Gossner and Tomala [GT04b] prove that the maxmin of the repeated game
(where player i is minimizing) is the highest payoﬀ obtained by using two
correlation systems Z1 and Z2 with respective time frequencies λ1, λ2 =
1−λ1 under the constraint that the average entropy variation is non-negative
(i.e. λ1∆H(Z1) + λ2∆H(Z2) ≥ 0). To achieve this payoﬀ, the opponents
of i start by generating signals that give little information to player i (they
accumulate entropy). Then they play alternatively a correlation system that
yields a bad payoﬀ but generates entropy (has a positive entropy variation)
and another that uses the entropy just generated to yield a good payoﬀ. The
constraint on the frequencies of the correlation system is that on average,
the entropy variation must be greater than or equal to zero.
The aim of the present paper is to develop tools for computing optimal
solutions of this problem when the team against player i consists of two play-
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8ers. In order to compute the combination of correlation system that yields
the highest payoﬀ under the entropy constraint, we study the auxiliary prob-
lem that consists in computing optimal correlation systems associated with
a ﬁxed correlated distribution of actions of the team: this is the correlation
system with maximal entropy variation inducing this distribution. We de-
rive general properties of the solutions and a full characterization of these
solutions when each of the team player’s action spaces has two elements.
Relying these solutions, we deduce a full analytic characterization of the
maxmin of an example of repeated game with imperfect monitoring. An-
other application of our characterization of optimal correlation systems has
been developed by Goldberg [Gol03] (see section 5 below). Beyond the game
studied in this paper, the tools we develop may serve as a basis for com-
putations of solutions of maximization problems under entropy constraints
raising from other optimization or game theoretic problems.
This paper is part of a growing body of literature on entropy methods
in repeated games. Lehrer [Leh88] and Lehrer and Smorodinsky [LS00] use
the relative entropy as a distance between probability measures. Neyman
Okada [NO99], [NO00] use entropy as a measure of the randomness of a
mixed strategy, and apply it to repeated games played by boundedly rational
players. Gossner and Vieille [GV02] compute the maxmin value of a zero-
sum repeated game where the maximizing player is not allowed to randomize
freely but privately observes an exogenous i.i.d. process, and show that this
value depends on the exogenous process through its entropy only. Gossner,
Hernandez and Neyman [GHN04] apply entropy methods to the study of
optimal use of communication resources.
We present the model, an example and the auxiliary optimization prob-
lem in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to optimal correlation systems. Section
4 solves the speciﬁc example. The proofs of the main results are postponed
to section 5. We discuss possible extensions and applications in section 6.
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82 The repeated game with signals
We consider a 3-player ﬁnite game Γ where players 1 and 2 have identical
payoﬀs opposed to the payoﬀ of player 3. The set of players is I = {1,2,3},
Ai is player i’s ﬁnite set of actions, and A = A1 × A2 × A3. The payoﬀ
function to players 1 and 2 is g : A → R, and −g is the payoﬀ function of
player 3. The set of mixed strategies for player i is Xi = ∆(Ai), and the
set of correlated strategies for players 1 and 2 is X12 = ∆(A1 × A2). For
x ∈ X1 and y ∈ X2, x⊗y represents the direct product of x and y, and the
subset of X12 consisting of product measures is X = X1 ⊗ X2.
The game is inﬁnitely repeated and at after each stage t = 1,2,..., if
a = (a1,a2,a3) is the proﬁle of actions played by the players at stage t, both
players 1 and 2 observe a while player 3 observes f(a1,a2) where f is a ﬁxed
mapping from A1 × A2 to some ﬁnite set of signals. Players 1 and 2 thus
have perfect monitoring and player 3 has imperfect monitoring. The team
{1,2} is maximizing the long-run average payoﬀ while player 3 is minimizing
this payoﬀ. The solution concept we consider is the maxmin of the inﬁnitely
repeated game (for a precise deﬁnition see e.g. [GT04b]).
2.1 An example
For a given payoﬀ speciﬁcation, we show how the signalling structure aﬀects
the maxmin payoﬀ. One of the aims of this paper is to compute the maxmin
payoﬀ for this payoﬀ speciﬁcation and one signalling structure of particular
interest.
The payoﬀ speciﬁcation is as follows. Players 1 and 2 play a coordination
game: each of them chooses between spending the evening at the bar ‘Golden
Gate’ (G) or at the bar ‘Happy Hours’ (H). Player 3 faces the same choice.
The payoﬀ for the ﬁrst two players is 1 if they meet at the same bar and
3 chooses the other bar, otherwise the payoﬀ is 0. The payoﬀ function is
displayed below where 1 chooses the row, 2 the column and 3 the matrix.
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8G H
G 0 0
H 0 1
G
G H
G 1 0
H 0 0
H
The uncorrelated maxmin of the one-shot game is 1
4 and may be obtained
in the repeated game by the team {1,2} by playing the same mixed action
(1
2, 1
2) at every stage.
The correlated maxmin of the one-shot game is 1
2. This may be obtained
by players 1 and 2 in the repeated game if they can induce player 3 to
believe, at almost every stage, that (G,G) and (H,H) will both be played
with probability 1
2 and if their play is independent on player 3’s behavior.
For example, if player 3 has no information concerning the past moves of
the opponents, then team {1,2} may achieve its goal by randomizing evenly
at the ﬁrst stage, and coordinate all subsequent moves on the ﬁrst action of
player 1.
The case of particular interest is when player 3 observes the actions of
player 2 but not of player 1, i.e.f(a1,a2) = a2. The study of this game with
this signalling structure, which we denote Γ0, was proposed by [RT98].
The following strategies for players 1 and 2 achieve partial correlation in
the repeated game:
• At odd stages, play (1
2, 1
2) ⊗ (1
2, 1
2),
• at even stages, repeat the previous move of player 1. Player 3’s belief
is then that (G,G) is played with probability 1
2 and (H,H) with the
same probability.
The limit time-average payoﬀ yielded by this strategy is 3
8. How much
correlation can be achieved by the team {1,2} in this game? Can the team
improve on 3
8? Is it possible to achieve complete correlation? As an appli-
cation of our main results (theorem 7) we prove that full correlation is not
achievable, but the team can improve sharply on 3
8. Some optimal level of
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8correlation is achievable, and the corresponding payoﬀ lies between 0.4020
and 0.4021 (corollary 10).
2.2 The optimization problem
The entropy of a ﬁnite support probability distribution P = (pl)L
l=1 is given
by H(P) = −
 L
l=1 pl log(pl) where log = log2 and 0log0 = 0. For the case
of binary distributions (x,1−x), we let h(x) = −xlog(x)−(1−x)log(1−x).
Deﬁnition 1 A correlation system Z is a distribution with ﬁnite support
on X:
Z =
K  
k=1
pkδxk⊗yk
where for each k, pk ≥ 0,
 
k pk = 1, xk ∈ X1, yk ∈ X2 and δxk⊗yk stands
for the Dirac measure on xk ⊗ yk. Hence, for each k, the probability under
Z of xk ⊗ yk is pk.
• The distribution of actions for players 1 and 2 induced by Z is
D(Z) =
 
k pkxk ⊗ yk, an element of X12.
• The payoﬀ yielded by Z is π(D(Z)) = mina3 g(D(Z),a3).
• The distribution of signals for player 3 induced by Z is f(D(Z)),
i.e. for each signal u, f(D(Z))(u) =
 
f(a1,a2)=u D(Z)(a1,a2).
• The entropy variation of Z is ∆H(Z) =
 
k pk(H(xk) + H(yk)) −
H(f(D(Z))).
The interpretation is the following. The set {1,...,K} represents the
set of events secretly observed by the team before a given stage, and pk
is the probability that player 3 assigns to the event k. Under Z, players
(1,2) play (xk,yk) if they observe k. Hence, given player 3’s information
(who ignores the true value of k) the distribution of actions of the team is
D(Z). Player 3 plays a best response to D(Z) and the corresponding payoﬀ
is π(D(Z)). The amount
 
k pk(H(xk) + H(yk)) is the expected entropy of
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8the mixed proﬁle of the team, whereas H(f(D(Z))) represents the entropy
of the signal observed by player 3. The diﬀerence between the entropy added
to the information of the team and of the new information to player 3 is the
entropy variation ∆H(Z).
Examples. Consider the game Γ0. We identify a mixed strategy x for
player 1 [resp. y for player 2] to the probability it puts on G.
• Let Z = δx⊗y. The payoﬀ π(D(Z)) is then min{xy;(1 − x)(1 − y)}.
Since the signal is the move of player 2, f(D(Z)) puts weight y on G.
Applying deﬁnition 1, we have ∆H(Z) = (H(x) + H(y)) − H(y) =
H(x). Among the set of correlation systems that are Dirac measures,
the payoﬀ is maximal for x = y = 1
2 and takes the value 1
4. The
entropy variation is also maximal for x = y = 1
2 and takes the value
1. Let Z1
2 = δ 1
2⊗ 1
2.
• Let Z1 = 1
2δ1⊗1+1
2δ0⊗0. The distribution induced is D(Z1) =


1
2 0
0 1
2


and the associated payoﬀ is π(D(Z1)) = 1
2. The distribution of signals
f(D(Z)) puts weight 1
2 on both G and H and for each k, h(xk) =
h(yk) = 0, so the entropy variation is −1.
• The cyclic strategy devised in case 3 of section 2.1 consists in playing
Z1
2 at odd stages and Z1 at even stages, so that we cyclically gain and
lose 1 bit of entropy. The payoﬀ obtained is the average between these
of Z1
2 and Z1, hence 3
8.
Consider the map U : R → R∪{−∞} deﬁned by the following optimiza-
tion problem:
U(c) = sup
Z:∆H(Z)≥c
π(D(Z))
We recall the following result from Gossner and Tomala [GT04b]
Lemma 2 The maxmin of the inﬁnitely repeated game is
cavU(0)
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8where cavU is the smallest concave function pointwise greater than U.
The maxmin of the repeated game with imperfect monitoring thus writes
as the maxmin of a game in which the team {1,2} may choose an arbi-
trary correlation system at each stage under the constraint that the aver-
age entropy variation is non-negative. This represents the optimal trade-
oﬀ for this team between generating correlation (by playing some Z1 with
∆H(Z1) > 0), and using correlation to get a good payoﬀ (by playing some
Z2 with ∆H(Z2) < 0).
3 An auxiliary optimization problem
We develop the analytic tools that facilitate the computation of the map U.
We do this through the resolution of an auxiliary optimization problem.
3.1 Optimal correlation systems
Since the payoﬀ π(D(Z)) depends on Z through the induced distribution
D(Z) only, we study how to induce a given distribution D by a Z with
maximal entropy variation.
Deﬁnition 3 Given D ∈ X12, a correlation system Z is optimal for D if:
1. D(Z) = D;
2. For every Z′ such that D(Z′) = D, ∆H(Z′) ≤ ∆H(Z).
A correlation system Z is optimal if it is optimal for D(Z).
The existence of optimal correlation systems does not follow directly
from the deﬁnition, but is a consequence of the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For every D ∈ X12, there exists Z optimal for D which has
ﬁnite support of cardinal no more than
   A1    +
   A2   .
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8Proof. Let D ∈ X12, identifying an action ai of player i with the mixed
strategy δai ∈ Xi, one has:
D =
 
a1,a2
D(a1,a2)δa1⊗a2
Thus the set of Z such that D(Z) = D is non-empty. Now for each Z =
 K
k=1 pkδxk⊗yk such that D(Z) = D, the vector (D(Z),∆H(Z)) writes:
(D(Z),∆H(Z)) =
K  
k=1
pk (δxk⊗yk,H(xk) + H(yk) − H(f(D)))
and, indentifying δxk⊗yk with xk ⊗ yk, it belongs to the convex hull of the
set:
S =
 
(x ⊗ y,H(x) + H(y) − H(f(D))) | x ∈ X1,y ∈ X2 
which lies in a vector space of dimension (
   A1    − 1) + (
   A2    − 1) + 1. From
Carath´ eodory’s theorem, it can be obtained by a convex combination of at
most
   A1    +
   A2    points in S. Summing up, for each distribution D and
correlation system Z s.t.D(Z) = D, there exists Z′ with |suppZ′| ≤ K,
D(Z′) = D and ∆H(Z′) = ∆H(Z). It is plain that the set of correlation
systems Z′ s.t. |suppZ′| ≤ K and D(Z′) = D is a nonempty ﬁnite di-
mensional compact set and that the mapping ∆H is continuous on it. The
maximum of ∆H is thus attained on this set.
The set of optimal correlation systems possesses a kind of consistency
property. Roughly, one cannot ﬁnd in the support of an optimal system,
a sub-system which is not optimal. In geometric terms, if we denote by Z
the set of all correlation systems and F(Z) the minimal geometric face of
the convex Z containing Z, then the following lemma shows that if Z is
optimal then any correlation system that belongs to F(Z) is also optimal
(for a precise deﬁnition of the geometric face in inﬁnite dimension, see e.g.
[Lar04]).
Lemma 5 Let Z be an optimal correlation system. If Z = λZ′ +(1−λ)Z′′
for some 0 < λ ≤ 1 and correlation systems Z′,Z′′, then Z′ is optimal.
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8In particular, if Z =
 K
k=1 pkδxk⊗yk is optimal, then for any k1 and k2
in {1,...,K} such that pk1 + pk2 > 0,
pk1
pk1+pk2
δxk1⊗yk1 +
pk2
pk1+pk2
δxk2⊗yk2 is
optimal.
Proof. Assume that Z = λZ′+(1−λ)Z′′ with 0 < λ ≤ 1 and that Z′ is
not optimal. There exists Z∗ s.t. D(Z∗) = D(Z′) and ∆H(Z∗) > ∆H(Z′).
Deﬁne Z0 = λZ∗+(1−λ)Z′′, then D(Z0) = D(Z) and ∆H(Z0)−∆H(Z) =
λ(∆H(Z∗) − ∆H(Z′)) contradicting the optimality of Z.
If we select for each D an optimal correlation system ZD, the mapping
U can be written as:
U(c) = sup
D:∆H(ZD)≥c
π(D),
so that to compute U, it suﬃces to compute one optimal ZD for each dis-
tribution D. Note that ZD is optimal for D if and only if:
∆H(ZD) = max
Z:D(Z)=D
∆H(Z)
= max
Z:D(Z)=D
 
 
k
pk(H(xk) + H(yk))
 
− H(f(D)),
so that ZD is optimal for D if and only if it is a solution of
max
Z:D(Z)=D
 
k
pk(H(xk) + H(yk)) (PD)
Note that this problem and therefore the notion of optimal correlation
system, do not depend on payoﬀs and signals. A characterization of the
solutions of (PD) is thus a tool for computing U(c) for any payoﬀ function g
and signaling function f. We establish the following properties on the value
of (PD), which are independent of the size of the game.
Proposition 6 1. The mapping ϕ: D  → value of PD is the smallest
concave function on X12 that pointwise dominates the entropy function
on X, i.e. ϕ(x ⊗ y) ≥ H(x) + H(y) for each x ⊗ y ∈ X.
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82. For each D, ϕ(D) ≤ H(D) and ϕ(D) = H(D) iﬀ.D is a product
distribution.
3. ϕ is continuous on X12.
Proof. (1) Let f be the bounded mapping f : X12 → R, such that
f(D) =



H(D) if D ∈ X
0 if D / ∈ X
Then ϕ = cavf the smallest concave function on X12 that is pointwise
greater than f.
(2) If D =
 
k pkxk ⊗ yk, by concavity of the entropy function, H(D) ≥
 
k pk(H(xk)+H(yk)), thus H(D) ≥ ϕ(D). Assume D ∈ X i.e. D = x⊗y,
by point (1) ϕ(x ⊗ y) ≥ H(x ⊗ y) so that ϕ(x ⊗ y) = H(x ⊗ y). If D / ∈ X,
from proposition 4 there exists (pk,xk,yk)k s.t. D =
 
k pkxk ⊗ yk and
ϕ(D) =
 
k pk(H(xk ⊗yk)) and by strict concavity of the entropy function,
ϕ(D) < H(D).
(3) Since f is uppersemicontinuous and X12 is a polytope, we deduce
from Laraki [Lar04] (theorem 1.16, proposition 2.1 and proposition 5.2) that
ϕ is uppersemicontinuous. Also, since X12 is a polytope and ϕ is bounded
and concave, we deduce from Rockafellar [Roc70] (theorem 10.2 and theorem
20.5) that ϕ is lowersemicontinuous.
3.2 Characterization when team members have two actions
We characterize optimal correlation systems when each team player pos-
sesses two actions. Hence assume from now on that A1 = A2 = {G,H}. We
shall identify a mixed strategy x (resp. y) of player 1 (resp. 2) with the
probability of playing G, i.e.to a number in the interval [0,1]. We denote
distributions D ∈ X12 by:
D =

 d1 d2
d3 d4

,
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8where d1 denotes the probability of the team’s action proﬁle (H,H), d2 the
probability of (H,G) etc.
The following theorem shows that the optimal correlation system asso-
ciated to any D is unique, contains at most two elements in its support,
can be easily computed for a given distribution, and that the set of optimal
correlation systems admits a simple parametrization.
Theorem 7 For every D ∈ X12, there exists a unique ZD which is optimal
for D. Moreover,
• If det(D) = 0, ZD = δx⊗y where
x = d1 + d2 , y = d1 + d3
• If det(D) < 0, ZD = pδx⊗y + (1 − p)δy⊗x where
x and y are the two solutions of the second degree polynomial equation
X2 − (2d1 + d2 + d3)X + d1 = 0
and
p =
y − (d1 + d2)
y − x
.
• If det(D) > 0, ZD = pδ1−x⊗y + (1 − p)δ1−y⊗x where
x and y are the two solutions of the second degree polynomial equation
X2 − (2d3 + d4 + d1)X + d3 = 0
and
p =
y − (d3 + d4)
y − x
The proof in provided in section 5.1. Remark that each correlation sys-
tem involves two points only in its support and that the parametrization of
optimal correlation systems involves 3 parameters, matching the dimension
of X12. Note that proposition 4 only proves the existence of optimal corre-
lation systems with
   A1    +
   A2    = 4 points in their support, thus described
by 11 parameters.
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84 Application to Γ0
The optimal correlation systems are independent of the payoﬀ function and
signalling structures of the underlying game. We compute U(c) for Γ0 in-
troduced in section 2.1. We introduce a family of correlation systems of
particular interest.
Notation 8 For x ∈ [0,1] let Zx = 1
2δx⊗x + 1
2δ(1−x)⊗(1−x).
It follows from theorem 7 that each Zx is optimal. Actually, (Zx)x is the
family of correlation systems associated to probability measures that put
equal weights on (G,G) and on (H,H), and equal weights on (G,H) and on
(H,G). Against each Zx, player 3 is thus indiﬀerent between his two actions
and therefore,
π(D(Zx)) =
1
2
(x2 + (1 − x)2).
For each k = 1,2, H(xk) = H(yk) = h(x) and the law of signals under Z(x)
is (1
2, 1
2) thus,
∆H(Zx) = 2h(x) − 1.
The following result, proved in section 5.3, shows that the map U can be
obtained from the family (Zx)x.
Proposition 9 Consider the game Γ0. For any c ∈ [−1,1],
U(c) = π(D(Zxc)) =
1
2
(x2
c + (1 − xc)2)
with xc the unique point in
 
0, 1
2
 
such that 2h(xc) − 1 = c. Moreover, U is
concave.
It follows that the maxmin for the game Γ0 is U(0).
Corollary 10 The maxmin of the inﬁnitely repeated game Γ0 is:
v =
1
2
(x2
0 + (1 − x0)2)
where x0 is the unique solution in [0, 1
2] of
−xlog(x) − (1 − x)log(1 − x) =
1
2
Numerically, 0.4020 < v < 0.4021.
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Figure 1: The graph of U
Remark 11 In contrast with a ﬁnite zero-sum stochastic game, the maxmin
here is transcendental. A similar property holds for the asymptotic value
of a repeated game with incomplete information on both sides (see Mertens
and Zamir [MZ81]) and of a “Big Match” with incomplete information on
one side (see Sorin [Sor84]).
5 Proofs of the main results
5.1 Proof of theorem 7
For each integer m, let Cm(D) be the set of set vectors (pk,xk,yk)m
k=1 where:



∀k,pk ≥ 0,
 m
k=1 pk = 1,xk ∈ X1,yk ∈ X2
 m
k=1 pkxk ⊗ yk = D
This set is clearly compact and the mapping
(pk,xk,yk)m
k=1  →
m  
k=1
pk(H(xk) + H(yk))
is continuous on it. The problem (PD) can thus be written as:
sup
m
max
Cm(D)
m  
k=1
pk(H(xk) + H(yk)) (PD)
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8Denote by (Pm,D), m ≥ 2, the second maximization problem where m is
ﬁxed:
max
Cm(D)
m  
k=1
pk(h(xk) + h(yk)) (Pm,D)
5.1.1 Solving (P2,D).
Given D ∈ X12, a point in C2(D) is a vector (p,(x1,y1),(x2,y2)) ∈ [0,1]
5
such that:
D = p

 x1y1 x1(1 − y1)
(1 − x1)y1 (1 − x1)(1 − y1)

+(1−p)

 x2y2 x2(1 − y2)
(1 − x2)y2 (1 − x2)(1 − y2)


The problem (P2,D) writes:
max
C2(D)
p(h(x1) + h(y1)) + (1 − p)(h(x2) + h(y2)) (P2,D)
We are concerned with the computation of the set of solutions:
Λ(D) := argmaxC2(D)p(h(x1) + h(y1)) + (1 − p)(h(x2) + h(y2))
The problem (P2,D) is the maximization of a continuous function on a com-
pact set, thus Λ(D)  = ∅ if C2(D)  = ∅. We will use the following parame-
trization: for D =

 d1 d2
d3 d4

, set r = d1 +d2, s = d1 +d3 and t = d1. The
vector (p,(x1,y1),(x2,y2)) ∈ [0,1]
5 is in C2(D) if and only if:

  
  
px1 + (1 − p)x2 = r
py1 + (1 − p)y2 = s
px1y1 + (1 − p)x2y2 = t
Note that det(D) := d1d4 − d2d3 = t − rs.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of the following
characterization of Λ(D):
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8Proposition 12 (A) If det(D) = 0, then
Λ(D) = {(p,(r,s),(r,s)) : p ∈ [0,1]}
∪
 
(1,(r,s),(y1,y2)) : (y1,y2) ∈ [0,1]
2
 
∪
 
(0,(x1,x2),(r,s)) : (x1,x2) ∈ [0,1]
2
 
(B) If det(D) < 0,
Λ(D) = {(
β − r
β − α
,(α,β),(β,α));(
α − r
α − β
,(β,α),(α,β))}
where α and β are the two solutions of:
X2 − (2d1 + d2 + d3)X + d1 = 0.
(C) If det(D) > 0,
Λ(D) = {(
β − (1 − r)
β − α
,(1−α,β),(1−β,α));(
α − (1 − r)
α − β
,(1−β,α),(1−α,β))}
where α and β are the two solutions of:
X2 − (2d3 + d4 + d1)X + d3 = 0.
Proof of proposition 12. Remark that in (A), all solutions correspond
to the same correlation system. The same applies to (B) and (C), in which
both elements of Λ(D) induce the same correlation system. Solutions of
(P2,D) always lead to a unique correlation system.
Point (A). The formula given in proposition 12 for Λ(D) clearly deﬁnes a
subset of C2(D). Note that det(D) = 0 if and only if D = r⊗s. (A) follows
then directly from point (3) of lemma 6.
Points (B) and (C). We ﬁrst show that these cases are deduced from
one another by symmetry. Take a distribution D =

 d1 d2
d3 d4

 and a point
(p,(x1,y1),(x2,y2)) in Λ(D). Let then D′ =

 d3 d4
d1 d2

 and remark that:
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• (p,(1 − x1,y1),(1 − x2,y2)) ∈ Λ(D′).
Remark also that the two solutions given in proposition 12 for case (C) are
the symmetric of the solutions for case (B). We thus need to prove (B) only.
Since α and β are solutions of:
X2 − (2d1 + d2 + d3)X + d1 = 0.
we have α + β = r + s and αβ = t. Thus α, β,
β−r
β−α and
r−β
α−β are in [0,1].
One then easily veriﬁes that:

  
  
β−r
β−αα +
r−β
α−ββ = r
β−r
β−αβ +
r−β
α−βα = s
β−r
β−ααβ +
r−β
α−ββα = r
The solutions given in proposition 12 for case (B) are thus in C2(D) which
is therefore non empty. In particular, any 2 × 2 joint distribution can be
decomposed as a convex combination of two independent distributions.
We solve now the case where D is in the boundary of X12.
Case 1. D is in the boundary.
Assuming det(D) < 0, we get either:
D = D1 =

 

0 r
s 1 − r − s

 

or
D = D2 =




1 − r − s s
r 0




with rs > 0. We solve for D1, the other case being similar. The vector
(p,(x1,y1),(x2,y2)) is in Λ(D1) if and only if
px1 + (1 − p)x2 = r
py1 + (1 − p)y2 = s
px1y1 + (1 − p)x2y2 = 0
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x2y2 = 0. We assume wlog. x1 = 0. We get then x2 = r
1−p  = 0, y2 = 0, and
y1 = s
p. The problem (P2,D1) is then reduced to maximizing over p ∈ (0,1)
the expression:
ph(
s
p
) + (1 − p)h(
r
1 − p
)
A solution in (0,1) exists, from the non emptiness of Λ(D1). The ﬁrst order
condition writes:
h(
s
p
) −
s
p
h′(
s
p
) = h(
r
1 − p
) −
r
1 − p
h′(
r
1 − p
)
The map f : (0,1) → R given by f(x) = h(x)−xh′(x) has derivative f′(x) =
−xh′′(x) > 0, hence is strictly increasing. Thus, the ﬁrst order condition is
equivalent to r
1−p = s
p, or p = s
r+s. We have thus shown:
Λ(D1) =
  
s
r + s
,0,r + s,r + s,0
 
;
 
r
r + s
,r + s,0,0,r + s
  
Case 2. D is interior.
We assume now that mini∈{1,...,4}(di) > 0. The proof is organized in a serie
of lemmata. Lemma 13 proves that all solutions are interior. Therefore they
must verify a ﬁrst order condition. First order equations are established
in lemma 14. Lemma 15 studies the solutions of the ﬁrst order equations
and lemma 16 shows unicity of those solutions. We conclude the proof with
lemma 17.
We prove now that any solution of (P2,D) is interior. This is due to the fact
that the entropy function has inﬁnite derivative at the boundary.
Lemma 13 If mini∈{1,...,4}(di) > 0 and det(D)  = 0 then Λ(D) ⊂ (0,1)5.
Proof. We prove that elements of Λ(D) are interior. Take a point
Z = (p,(x1,y1),(x2,y2)) in C2(D). Since det(D)  = 0, 0 < p < 1. We
show that if x1 = 0, Z is not optimal for (P2,D). The proof is completed
by symmetry. We assume thus x1 = 0 and construct a correlation system
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1,yε
1),(xε
2,yε
2)) in C2(D) as follows. Since Z ∈ C2(D):

  
  
(1 − p)x2 = r
py1 + (1 − p)y2 = s
(1 − p)x2y2 = t
Take ε > 0 and let:

        
        
pε = p + ε
xε
1 =
 
1 −
p
pε
 
x2
xε
2 = x2
yε
1 = y1
yε
2 =
1−p
1−pεy2 −
pε−p
1−pεy1
Since t = (1 − p)x2y2  = 0, there exists ε0 > 0 such that Zε ∈ [0,1]
5 for
0 < ε ≤ ε0. A simple computation shows that Zε is in C2(D). We now
compare the objective function of (P2,D) at Zε and at Z.
(pε (h(xε
1) + h(yε
1)) + (1 − pε)(h(xε
2) + h(yε
2)))
−(p[h(x1) + h(y1)] + (1 − p)[h(x2) + h(y2)])
= qh(xε
1) + (1 − pε)h(yε
2) − (1 − p)h(y2)
= (p + ε)h(
 
1 −
p
p + ε
 
x2) + (1 − p − ε)h(
1 − p
1 − p − ε
y2 −
ε
1 − p − ε
y1) − (1 − p)h(y2)
= ph(εx2) + (1 − p)h(y2 −
ε
1 − p
y1) − (1 − p)h(y2) + o(ε)
= ph(εx2) − εy1h′(y2) + o(ε)
= p[−εx2 ln(εx2) − (1 − εx2)ln(1 − εx2)] − εy1h′(y2) + o(ε)
= ε
 
−px2 ln(εx2) − y1h′(y2) + x2 + o(1)
 
> 0
for ε small enough.
Solutions of (P2,D) being interior, they must verify ﬁrst order conditions.
Given x and y in (0,1), recall that the Kullback distance dK(x y) of x with
respect to y is deﬁned by:
dK(x y) = −xlog
x
y
− (1 − x)log
1 − x
1 − y
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dK(x y) = h(y) − h(x) − h′(y)(y − x),
where h′ denotes the derivative of h.
Lemma 14 Suppose that mini(di) > 0 and det(D)  = 0. If (p,x1,y1,x2,y2) ∈
Λ(D) then : 


dK(x2  x1) = dK(y1  y2)
dK(x1  x2) = dK(y2  y1)
(E)
Proof. The Lagrangian of (P2,D) writes:
L(p,x1,y1,x2,y2,α,β,γ) = p(h(x1) + h(y1)) + (1 − p)(h(x2) + h(y2))
+α(px1 + (1 − p)x2 − r) + β(py1 + (1 − p)y2 − s)
+γ(px1y1 + (1 − p)x2y2 − t)
The partial derivatives are

        
        
∂L
∂p = (h(x1) + h(y1)) − (h(x2) + h(y2)) + α(x1 − x2) + β(y1 − y2) + γ(x1y1 − x2y2)
∂L
∂x1 = p(h′(x1) + α + γy1)
∂L
∂x2 = (1 − p)(h′(x2) + α + γy2)
∂L
∂y1 = p(h′(y1) + β + γx1)
∂L
∂y2 = (1 − p)(h′(y2) + β + γx2)
If (p,x1,y1,x2,y2) ∈ Λ(D), there exists (α,β,γ) such that:

        
        
(h(x1) + h(y1)) − (h(x2) + h(y2)) + α(x1 − x2) + β(y1 − y2) + γ(x1y1 − x2y2) = 0
h′(x1) + α + γy1 = 0
h′(x2) + α + γy2 = 0
h′(y1) + β + γx1 = 0
h′(y2) + β + γx2 = 0
(E1)
(E2)
(E3)
(E4)
(E5)
The combination of equations (E1) − x1 × (E2) + x2 × (E3) gives:
(h(x1) + h(y1)) − (h(x2) + h(y2)) = x1h′(x1) − x2h′(x2) − β(y1 − y2) (1)
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y1
 
h′(y1) − h′(y2)
 
= h′(x1)(x1 − x2) + α(x1 − x2) (2)
Equations (1) and (2) give:
h(x1) − h(x2) − h′(x1)(x1 − x2) = h(y2) − h(y1) − h′(y2)(y2 − y1)
which rewrites:
dK(x2  x1) = dK(y1  y2)
Similarly we obtain:
dK(x1  x2) = dK(y2  y1)
We give now the solutions of the equations (E).
Lemma 15 Assume dK(x a) = dK(b y) and dK(a x) = dK(y  b). Then
one of the following holds:
(F1) x = b, y = a;
(F2) x = 1 − b, y = 1 − a;
(F3) x = a, y = b.
Proof. Fix a and b in (0,1). We need to solve the system:



dK(x a) − dK(b y) = 0
dK(a x) − dK(y  b) = 0
(S)
It is immediate to check that (F1), (F2), and (F3) are solutions of (S).
Letting S(x,y) = (dK(x a)−dK(b y),dK(a x)−dK(y  b)), the Jacobian
J(x,y) of S writes:
J(x,y) = det


ln( x
1−x) − ln( a
1−a) 1−a
1−x − a
x
1−b
1−y − b
y ln(
y
1−y) − ln
 
b
1−b
 


= ln
x(1 − a)
a(1 − x)
× ln
y(1 − b)
b(1 − y)
−
(x − a) × (y − b)
x(1 − x)y(1 − y)
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8since for all z > 1, 0 < ln(z) < z − 1, if x > a and y > b then
0 < ln
x(1 − a)
a(1 − x)
<
x(1 − a)
a(1 − x)
− 1 =
x − a
1 − x
<
x − a
x(1 − x)
and
0 < ln
y(1 − b)
b(1 − y)
<
y(1 − b)
b(1 − y)
=
y − b
1 − y
<
y − b
y(1 − y)
Hence, on the domain {x > a,y > b} one has:
ln
x(1 − a)
a(1 − x)
× ln
b(1 − y)
y(1 − b)
<
x − a
1 − x
×
y − b
1 − y
<
(x − a) × (b − y)
x(1 − x)y(1 − y)
.
thus J(x,y) < 0 on the domain {x > a,y > b}. The mappings x  →
dK(x a) := fa(x) and y  → dK(b y) := gb(y) are diﬀerentiable and strictly
increasing on the intervals (a,1) and (b,1) respectively and setting F(x) :=
g−1
b ◦ fa(x) − f−1
b ◦ ga(x), S(x,y) = 0 if and only if F(x) = 0 and y =
g−1
b ◦ fa(x). Then if x0 ∈ (a,1) is such that F(x0) = 0, we let y0 :=
g−1
b ◦ fa(x0) = f−1
b ◦ fa(x0) ∈ (b,1) and F′(x0) =
J(x0,y0)
f
′
b(y0)×g′
b(y0) < 0, i.e. at a
zero of F, F′(x0) < 0. F admits thus at most one zero.
If a + b < 1, (1 − b,1 − a) is indeed a solution of (S) and we deduce:
D1. If a + b < 1, then (1 − b,1 − a) is the unique solution of (S) on
{x > a,y > b}.
Using z − 1 < ln(z) < 0 for all z < 1, we deduce that J(x,y) < 0 on the
domain {x < a, y < b}. We then obtain:
D2. If a + b > 1, then (1 − b,1 − a) is the unique solution of (S) on
{x < a, y < b}.
Similar arguments show that:
D3. If a < b, then (b,a) is the unique solution to (S) on {x > a, y < b}.
D4. If a > b, then (b,a) is the unique solution to (S) on {x < a, y > b}.
We are now in position to complete the proof of the lemma. First, if (x −
a)(y − b) = 0 then (S) implies x = a and y = b.
If (x − a)(y − b) > 0, we obtain (x,y) = (1 − b,1 − a) as follows:
• If a + b ≤ 1:
– If x < a and y < b then x + y < a + b ≤ 1. Apply D1 reversing
the roles of (x,y) and (a,b).
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8– If x > a, y > b and a + b  = 1. Apply D1.
– If x > a, y > b and a+b = 1 then x+y > 1. Apply D2, reversing
the roles.
• If a + b > 1:
– If x > a and y > b, then x + y > a + b > 1. Apply D2, reversing
the roles.
– If x < a and y < b, apply D2.
If (x − a)(y − b) < 0 we obtain (x,y) = (b,a) as follows:
• If a ≤ b:
– If x < a and y > b then x < y. Reverse the roles and apply D3.
– If x > a, y < b and a < b, apply D3.
– If x > a, y < b and a = b then x > y. Reverse the roles and
apply D4.
• If a > b:
– If x > a and y < b then x > y. Reversing the roles and apply D4.
– If x < a and y > b, apply D4.
Lemma 16 1. If det(D) < 0, solutions of (P2,D) are of type (F1).
2. If det(D) > 0, solutions of (P2,D) are of type (F2).
3. If det(D) = 0, solutions of (P2,D) are of type (F3).
Proof. Let (p,a,b) ∈ [0,1]3, it is straightforward to check that:
1. det[p(a ⊗ b) + (1 − p)(b ⊗ a)] ≤ 0
2. det[p(a ⊗ b) + (1 − p)[1 − b] ⊗ [1 − a]] ≥ 0
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We now conlude the proof of proposition 12
Lemma 17 Let D such that det(D) < 0. Then
Λ(D) = {(
β − r
β − α
,α,β,β,α);(
r − α
β − α
,β,α,α,β)}
where α and β are the two solutions of the equation X2 −(r +s)X +t = 0.
Proof. Assuming det(D) < 0, it follows from lemma 16 that any element
of Λ(D) is a tuple (p,(x,y),(y,x)), with:

  
  
px + (1 − p)y = r
py + (1 − p)x = s
pxy + (1 − p)yx = t
We deduce then: 


x + y = r + s
xy = t
so that x and y must be solutions of the equation: X2 − (r + s)X + t = 0
and p is given by p =
y−r
y−x. Note that:
∆ = (r + s)
2 − 4t ≥ 4(rs − t) = −4det(D) > 0
Hence, this equation admits two distinct solutions α and β.
The proof of proposition 12 is thus complete.
5.2 Solving (Pm,D)
To conlude the proof of theorem 7, we prove that for every D ∈ X12, the
value of Pm,D and of P2,D are the same. Recall from lemma 5 that if
(pk,xk,yk)k∈K is optimal for Pm,D, then for any pair (k1,k2) s.t. pk1+pk2 >
0, the correlation system ((
pk1
pk1+pk2
,xk1,yk1);(
pk2
pk1+pk2
,xk2,yk2)) is optimal
for the distribution it induces. We deduce the solutions of (Pm,D) and of
(PD) from the form of solutions of (P2,D)
Lemma 18 Let (pk,xk,yk)m
k=1 ∈ Cm(D) such that for all k, pk > 0.
If (pk,xk,yk)m
k=1 is optimal for (PD) then one of the following holds:
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8• ∀k, if (xk,yk)  = (x1,y1) then (xk,yk) = (y1,x1)
• ∀k, if (xk,yk)  = (x1,y1) then (xk,yk) = (1 − y1,1 − x1)
Proof. Suppose that (x2,y2)  = (x1,y1). Since (pk,xk,yk)k=1,...,m is
optimal for (PD),
  
p1
p1+p2,x1,y1
 
,
 
p2
p1+p2,x2,y2
  
is an optimal correlation
system. Then one has either (x2,y2) = (y1,x1) or (x2,y2) = (1−y1,1−x1).
Suppose wlog.that (x2,y2) = (y1,x1). Let us prove that if (xk,yk)  = (x1,y1)
then we have also (xk,yk) = (y1,x1). If it was not the case, we must have
(xk,yk) = (1 − y1,1 − x1). Thus we deduce that (xk,yk) = (1 − x2,1 − y2).
This is compatible with the form of optimal correlation system (with m = 2),
only if we have either (1−x2,1−y2) = (1−y2,1−x2) or (1−x2,1−y2) =
(y2,x2). This means that we must assume either x2 = y2 or x2 = 1 − y2. If
x2 = y2 then, since (x2,y2) = (y1,x1), we should have x1 = y1. This implies
that (x2,y2) = (x1,y1), a contradiction with our assumption that (x2,y2)  =
(x1,y1). Now, if x2 = 1 − y2 we deduce that (xk,yk) = (y2,x2) from which
we get (xk,yk) = (x1,y1), also in contradiction with our assumption. Hence,
if (x2,y2) = (y1,x1) then ∀k, if (xk,yk)  = (x1,y1) one has (xk,yk) = (y1,x1).
This ends the proof of theorem 7.
5.3 Proof of proposition 9
We use theorem 7 to solve the problem:
U(c) = max
D:∆H(ZD)≥c
π(D)
for the game Γ0.
Deﬁnition 19 A correlation system Z is dominated for Γ0 if there exists
Z′ such that π(D(Z′)) ≥ π(D(Z)) and ∆H(Z′) ≥ ∆H(Z) with at least one
strict inequality. Z is undominated otherwise.
From theorem 7, undominated correlation systems must be of the form
pδx⊗y +(1−p)δy⊗x or pδx⊗y +(1−p)δ1−y⊗1−x. The next lemma shows that
the ﬁrst family of solutions is dominated.
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8Lemma 20 Given Z = pδx⊗y + (1 − p)δy⊗x, let Z′ = δx⊗y and Z′′ = δy⊗x.
Then:
1. π(D(Z)) = π(D(Z′)) = π(D(Z′′))
2. ∆H(Z) ≤ max(∆H(Z′),∆H(Z′′)) with strict inequality if x  = y and
0 < p < 1.
Proof. For point (1), the common value is min(xy,(1 − x)(1 − y)).
Point (2) follows from the formulas ∆H(Z) = h(x)+h(y)−h(px+(1−p)y),
∆H(Z′) = h(x)+h(y)−h(x), ∆H(Z′′) = h(y)+h(x)−h(y) and the strict
concavity of h.
We search now solutions among the family of optimal correlation systems
pδx⊗y + (1 − p)δ1−y⊗1−x.
Lemma 21 Let Z = pδx⊗y + (1 − p)δ1−y⊗1−x, 0 < p < 1 and x  = 1 − y. If
Z is undominated for Γ0, then p = 1
2.
Proof. Denote the distribution induced by Z, D(Z) =

 d1(Z) d2(Z)
d3(Z) d4(Z)


Assuming x  = 1 − y, p = 1
2 is equivalent to d1(Z) = d4(Z). Assume by
contradiction that d1(Z)  = d4(Z) and by symmetry d1(Z) < d4(Z). The
Lagrangian of the maximization problem,
max π(D(Z))
 
Z = ((p,x,y);(1 − p,1 − y,1 − x))
∆H(Z) ≥ c
writes :
L = pxy + (1 − p)(1 − x)(1 − y) − α(h(x) + h(y) − h(px + (1 − p)(1 − y)))
Let ˜ y = 1 − y and z = px + (1 − p)˜ y:

  
  
∂L
∂p = (x − ˜ y)(1 − αh′(z))
∂L
∂x = −˜ y + p + α(h′(x) − ph′(z))
∂L
∂y = x − 1 + p + α(−h′(˜ y) + (1 − p)ph′(z))
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
  
  
h′(z) = 1
α
˜ y =
h′(x)
h′(z)
x =
h′(˜ y)
h′(z)
From the ﬁrst two conditions we deduce that h′(x)h′(˜ y) ≥ 0, hence x and
˜ y lie on the same side of 1
2. But then |h′(z)| ≥ |h′(x)| and |h′(z)| ≥ |h′(˜ y)|
is inconsistent with z lying in the strict interval of extremities x and ˜ y:
0 < p < 1, x  = ˜ y.
Lemma 22 Let Z = 1
2δx⊗y + 1
2δ1−y⊗1−x, with x  = 1 − y. If Z is not
dominated for Γ0, then x = y.
Proof. Let z =
x+y
2 , and Z′ = ((1
2,z,z),(1
2,1 − z,1 − z)). We prove
that Z′ dominates Z in G if x  = y. For payoﬀs, direct computation leads
π(D(Z′)) − π(D(Z)) = (
x+y
2 )2. For entropy variations, let ψ be deﬁned by
ψ(x,y) = h(x) + h(y) − h(
x+1−y
2 ). Then ∆H(Z) = ψ(x,y) = ψ(y,x) and
∆H(Z′) = ψ(
x+y
2 ,
x+y
2 ). Inequality ψ(
x+y
2 ,
x+y
2 ) >
ψ(x,y)+ψ(y,x)
2 will follow
from the strict concavity of ψ. The Jacobian matrix of ψ is:
J =

 h′′(x) − 1
4h′′(
x+1−y
2 ) −1
4h′′(
x+1−y
2 )
−1
4h′′(
x+1−y
2 ) h′′(y) − 1
4h′′(
x+1−y
2 )


Then, traceJ = h′′(x)+h′′(y)− 1
4h′′(
x+1−y
2 ) = h′′(x)+h′′(1−y)− 1
4h′′(
x+1−y
2 )
is negative since h′′ : t  → − 1
ln2(1
t + 1
1−t) is both concave and negative on
(0,1). Brute force computation of detJ shows:
detJ =
1
(ln2)2
(1 − x)(1 − y) + xy
xy(1 − x)(1 − y)(1 − x + y)(1 − y + x)
> 0
Hence the strict concavity of ψ, and the claim follows.
We prove now proposition 9. From the two previous lemmas, it follows
that an undominated correlation system is of the form Z(x) = 1
2δx⊗x +
1
2δ1−x⊗1−x with x ∈ [0,1]. The graph of c  → U(c) is thus the set:
C = {(∆H(Z),π(D(Z))),Z =
1
2
δx⊗x +
1
2
δ1−x⊗1−x and x ∈ [0,1]}
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2], and letting (s(x),t(x)) =
(2h(x) − 1, 1
2x2 + 1
2(1 − x)2), C is the parametric curve {(s(x),t(x)),x ∈
[0, 1
2]}. Since the slope α(x) of C at (s(x),t(x)) is
α(x) =
dt(x)/dx
ds(x)/dx
=
1 − 2x
log(1 − x) − log(x)
and
α′(x) =
2x − 1 + 2x(1 − x)ln(1 − 1
x)
ln(2)x(1 − x)(log(1 − x) − log(x))2
The numerator of this expression has derivative (1 − 2x)ln(1
x − 1) > 0,
and takes the value 0 at x = 1
2, hence it is nonnegative and so is α′(x). We
conclude that C is concave and that U(c) = π(D(Z(xc))) with ∆H(Z(xc)) =
2h(xc) − 1 = c and cavU(0) = U(0). This value is 1
2x2 + 1
2(1 − x)2, where
0 < x < 1 solves h(x) = 1
2. Numerical resolution yields 0.1100 < x < 0.1101
and 0.4020 < 1
2x2 + 1
2(1 − x)2 < 0.4021.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 On other games
The function U(c) is determined by the one-shot game and the signalling
function. Since we deal with the computation of cavU(0) two cases may
arise: either cavU(0) = U(0) (for example, if U is concave) or cavU(0) >
U(0) (if there exists two correlation systems Z1, Z2 and λ ∈ (0,1) s.t.
λπ(D(Z1))+(1−λ)π(D(Z2)) > U(0) and λ∆H(Z1)+(1−λ)∆H(Z2) ≥ 0).
In the previous section we have shown that the map U corresponding
to Γ0 is concave. Goldberg [Gol03] provides an example of the second case.
Consider the game where payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 are given by:
G H
G 1 0
H 3 1
G
G H
G 1 3
H 0 1
H
and the signalling function f is:
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8G H
G s s′′
H s′ s
G
The maxmin of the one-shot game is 5
4 and is obtained by the distribution
1
2 ⊗ 1
2. Allowing for correlation, the maxmin is 3
2 and is obtained by the
distribution 1
20 ⊗ 1 + 1
21 ⊗ 0.
Relying on theorem 7, Goldberg shows that U is convex so that its
concaviﬁcation is linear, thus cavU(0) = 4
3 = 2
3π(D(Z′))+ 1
3π(D(Z′′)) where
Z′ = δ 1
2⊗ 1
2 and Z′′ = 1
2δ0⊗1 + 1
2δ1⊗0.
6.2 Extensions and open problems
The obvious way of extending our results is to consider larger sets of actions
for the team players as well as larger teams. Assume that the team of players
{1,...,n} opposes player n + 1 in a repeated game where each player 1 ≤
i ≤ n has perfect monitoring and player n+1 observes a signal f(a1,...,an).
The characterization of the maxmin in [GT04b] is valid in this case. The
deﬁnition of correlation systems and of optimal correlation systems extend
naturally. A correlation system is a ﬁnite support distribution on the set of
mixed strategies: Z =
 
k pkδ⊗ixi
k with xi
k ∈ ∆(Ai). The correlation system
is optimal if D(Z) = D and Z solves:
max
Z:D(Z)=D
 
k
pk(
 
i
H(xi
k))
Then proposition 4, lemma 5 and proposition 6 perfectly extend.
Further, in the case of two team-players and general number of actions,
one can show that lemma 14 extends as follows: if the correlation system
αδx1⊗y1 + (1 − α)δx2⊗y2 with α ∈ (0,1) is optimal then



dK(x2  x1) = dK(y1  y2)
dK(x1  x2) = dK(y2  y1)
,
where dK(x y) is the Kulback distance between x and y.
The generalization of theorem 7 to the general setup is an open problem.
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